SECURITIES REGULATION: SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS AGAINST INSIDERS UNDER RULE lOb-5
After a general examination of Rule 10b-5 in the context of its
traditional application, this comment focuses on the recent developments concerning the rule's function as a weapon for the
enforcement of controlling insiders' duties to their corporation.
THE GENERAL anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, section 10 (b),1 (and rule lOb-5, 2 promulgated thereunder), has been focal to an extensive commentary respecting the
"securities acts [which] may be said to have generated a wholly
new and far reaching body of federal corporation law."3 The area
engendering most emphasis by scholars has been the civil liability
imposed under rule 1Ob-5 upon corporate insiders in favor of minority shareholders or outside investors whom the insider has deceived in buying or selling his corporation's securities. 4 An emerging new area, however, is the expansion of "federal corporation
law" to prescribe liability of insiders to their corporation under
rule lOb-5.
It has become increasingly apparent in the last five years that
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange'...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of' such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1964).
2"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
17 CF.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
3 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
'See generally, e.g., 3 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1421-74, 1763-97 (2d ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Loss]; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78
HAIv. L. REv. 1146 (1965); Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares
in a Close CorporationUnder the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONTzMP. PROB. 505 (1953);
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57
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successful shareholders' derivative actions might be prosecuted
under rule 1Ob-5 against insiders who seek personal benefit by
causing the corporation to buy or sell securities on unfavorable
terms. If this implementation of rule 1Ob-5 continues to expand,
it could effect a virtual federal preemption of much of the heretofore
exclusively state law concerning the fiduciary responsibility of
corporate management. 5 Because this aspect of rule lOb-5 has only
recently acquired practical significance, its discussion must be
prefaced by a general examination of the rule's twenty-four year
history.
The Promulgation of Rule 10b-5
The general prohibitions which constitute the antifraud provisions in the federal securities acts are reflections of the essential
objective of the whole regulatory scheme. They are designed "to
protect those who do not know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do."6 The antifraud provisions of the federal
acts diverged from the common law over which they had been superNw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
CorporationsBy Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Comment, 30 U. CM. L. Rv. 121 (1963); Comment, 59 YAri L.J. 1120 (1950).
5 There can of course be no absolute preemption of state fiduciary legislation
because the 1934 act specifically allows additional rights and remedies to be conferred under state law. Securities Exchange Act § 28, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §
78bb (1964). To a substantial degree, however, federal law could become dominant
because of the procedural advantages inherent in basing a shareholder derivative
action on rule lOb-5 instead of a claim under state law. Exclusive jurisdiction is accorded federal court actions founded on the Exchange Act, and is accompanied by
both broad venue provisions and extraterritorial service of process. Securities Exchange Act § 27, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
In addition, plaintiffs in a derivative action under rule lOb-5 are not subject
to obstacles such as state law requirements of posting security for expenses. McClure
v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Kane
v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Highly significant in this respect is the recent and sweeping Supreme Court approval of derivative actions against management for alleged misrepresentation in the solicitation
of proxies under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act. The Court emphasized that derivative
actions under the federal securities acts may not be impeded by state security-forexpenses provisions or any other state law requirements, and that it is the duty of
the courts to provide an effective remedy in accordance with the broad policies of
the securities acts. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-34 (1964).
Moreover, if a claim under rule lob-5 survives defendant's motion to dismiss,
plaintiff's state law claims would be properly before the court under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction, and most courts apparently regard the federal extraterritorial
service of process as sufficient to give personal jurisdiction with respect to the state
claims. Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., supra at 568. Plaintiffs may, however, be required to post security as to the state claims. Id. at 569.
1 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1944).
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imposed in that they were specifically designed to preserve the
integrity of the securities trading process and were given sufficient
breadth and flexibility to proscribe any conduct which .would menace
that integrity7 Thus section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act made unlawful
any fraudulent practice in the selling of any securities" and section
15 (c) (1) of the 1934 Act proscribed fraud by over-the-counter
broker-dealers in either selling or purchasing."
Until 1942, however, there was a serious loophole in the antifraud scheme, for there was nothing in the acts which operated to
prohibit fraud in the purchasingof securities by persons other than
broker-dealers. Thus corporate insiders could buy the securities
of their corporations by using fraudulent practices, with virtual
immunity from federal authority. To close this and any other loopholes not previously perceived the Securities Exchange Commission
in 1942 promulgated rule 1Ob-5, acting under the theretofore dormant section 10b of the 1934 act. 10 This rule, the broadest of all the
antifraud provisions, prohibited all fraudulent practices by any
person in connection with the sale or purchase of any securities.
The Judicial Inference and Development of
Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5
Despite the equality of protection for buyers and sellers which
the promulgation of rule lOb-5 effected by rendering fraud against
either a criminal offense, the buyer remained the favorite son of
the securities acts. The defrauded buyer was given express civil
remedies against the wrongdoer in sections 11,11 12 (1),12 and 12 (2)18
7 See 3 Loss 1430-44. On the operation of the common law with respect to securities transactions see generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE
L.J. 227 (1933).
8Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (a) (1964).
9Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15 (c) (1), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c) (1)
(1964).

10 3 Loss 1426-27.
11 Securities Act of

1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
Under § 11, if the registration statement for a registered security contains material
misstatements or omissions, the purchaser has a cause of action against all persons
who were instrumental in the initial sale of the stock to the general public. See
generally 3 Loss 1721-42.
12 Securities Act of 1933, § 12 (1), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 771(1) (1964).
The buyer of a security which should have been but was not registered has a cause
of action against his immediate seller under § 12 (1). See generally 3 Loss 1692-98.
13"Any person who . . . (2) offers or sells a security . . . [except, among others,
securities issued or guaranteed by the United States or a state or political subdivision],
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which

Vol.1966: 166]

DERIVATIVE ACTIONS UNDER 10b-5

169

of the 1933 act. These civil remedies were embodied in a closely
drawn statutory scheme and were subject to a number of significant

restrictions. For example, under section 12 (2) the buyer's action
for recission or damages against a seller who had made materially

false or misleading statements was (1) available only against the
seller, not others who may have deceitfully induced the purchase;'

4

(2) ineffectual even against the seller if he could prove his lack of
scienter;'5 and (3) subject to a short period of limitations.' 6 Despite
the restricted nature of the buyer's express civil remedies, in gen-

eral he continued to occupy a more favorable position than the
seller. Having no civil remedies under the securities acts, the seller

was relegated to the common law actions of deceit and recission. 7
This disparity was, however, short-lived, for in 1946 the leading
case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.' 8 held that civil liability

could be inferred from a violation of rule lOb-5.19
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security." Securities Act of 1933, § 12 (2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1964). See generally 3 Loss 1699-1712.
1 The action may be brought only against the actual seller or one who is a "controlling person" of the seller under § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
15 3 Loss 1704-05.
'1 The action must be brought within one year after discovery of the untrue
statement or omission and not more than three years after the date of the sale. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964). Other
significant restrictions on the buyer's action under § 12(2) include exemption of
sales of state and municipal securities and limiting the plaintiff to an action for
recission (as opposed to damages) if he still owns the stock at the time of suit.
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
17 With respect to the buyer's advantages and disadvantages under § 12(2) as
compared with his state law actions relating to deceit and recission, see 3 Loss 1702-05;
Latty, supra note 4, at 523-24.
18 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
10The Kardon court based its finding of an implied private right of action on two
theories: (1) the common law tort doctrine, embodied in 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286
(1934), that a private tort action exists in favor of those whose interests are intended
to be protected by a statute even though the statute expresses only a criminal sanction; and (2) the fact that § 29 (b) of the Exchange Act was specifically amended to
impose a short period of limitation for private actions against brokers under §
15 (c) (1), a section which is also silent about civil liability. 69 F. Supp. at 513-14.
For an extensive critical analysis of these theories see Ruder, Civil Liability Under
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The entrance of rule 1Ob-5 into the area of civil liability has
been described by one commentator as follows: "Into this neat
statutory scheme bursts X-10b-5 purporting to redress all grievances
in the securities field, giving causes of action to everybody, buyer
20
and seller alike, and for all bad deeds-and by implication at that."
This depiction contains no overstatement of the expansive applicability which the literal terms of rule 1Ob-5 could generate.
Rule lOb-5 expressly prohibits, and by implication prescribes civil
liability for the commission of, the following practices by any person: (1) employing any scheme or device to defraud; or (2) misrepresenting a material fact or omitting a material fact which causes
any statement made to be misleading; or (3) doing anything that
operates or would operate to deceive anyone.2 1 The only qualifications on the face of the rule are that the proscribed conduct must
be "in connection with the sale or purchase of any security" 22 and
must involve the use of the mails, interstate commerce, or the facili23
ties of a national securities exchange.
No clear-cut elements of a civil cause of action have yet been
judicially extrapolated from the generalities of rule lOb-5. The
Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 629-60
(1963).
Since Kardon, civil liability under rule 10b-5 has been upheld by courts of appeals
in most of the circuits. E.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242
(6th Cir. 1962); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th
Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). The existence of civil liability is implicit in
the opinion of a number of other decisions. See, e.g., James Blackstone Memorial Li.
brary Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1959); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d
464 (4th Cir. 1955); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), afJ'd, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner 8: Co., 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass.
1955).
20 Latty, supra note 4, at 514.
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964). See note 2 supra.
22This has been interpreted to mean that only an actually defrauded purchaser
or seller of securities may bring an action under the rule. Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
2- This requirement has been so liberally construed that it rarely constitutes a
significant obstacle to a rule lob-5 plaintiff. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,
282 F.2d 195, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1953); 3 Loss 1519-28. Civil liability under rule
lOb-5 can arise from transactions in which no national stock exchange, stock broker
or organized market is involved. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Fratt v. Robinson, supra; Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See generally Latty, supra note 4, at

509-12 (1953).
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courts have on the whole accorded an expansive ambit to the
rule's literal scope.2 4 Thus it appears that the buyer as well as
the seller has a cause of action under rule 10b-5, in addition to the
carefully limited express remedies given the buyer by the 1933
act.2 5 Apparently, neither the seller's nor the buyer's action under

rule lOb-5 is limited by the 1933 act restrictions. 26 It has been
established that only buyers or sellers of securities may sue under
the rule,27 but there is no strict requirement of "privity" between
plaintiff and defendant.2 8 Moreover, the deception which gives rise
to liability may relate to the value of the consideration given as well
as that of the securities bought or sold. 29 Finally, the courts have
repeatedly stated that the liability imposed by rule 1Ob-5 extends
well beyond the restrictive common law notions of fraud and
deceit.80 Actionable "fraud" under the rule is said to be "the infinite
variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of in31
vestors and others."
It would seem that the sweeping proscription of fraud contained
in the rule's first and third clauses would alone be adequate to en.
compass all actionable misconduct. However, most of the judicially
accepted rule lOb-5 claims have been sustained on the basis of the
rule's second clause, which applies to misstatements or misleading
omissions of material facts. 32 A fact is said to be "material" if a
33
reasonable investor's awareness of it would affect his judgment.
Once a misstatement or half-truth is shown to have been uttered
with respect to a material fact, the aggrieved plaintiff's claim is
virtually complete. The "reliance," "causation," and "scienter"
elements of the common law action for deceit are applied, if at all,
24 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., supra note 23.
25 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284

F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
A few of the early cases had denied buyers an implied right of action under rule
lOb-5, reasoning that the express right of action accorded by the 1933 act was exclusive. See, e.g., Rosenburg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y.

1948).
20 Ellis v. Carter, supra note 25, at 273. See generally 3 Loss 1778-92.
2 See note 22 supra.

2 See Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See
generally Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
"DErrion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
30 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"1Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
2 See cases cited note 19 supra.
"List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 1966: 166

in such watered-down form that they constitute only minor ob34
stacles to a rule lOb-5 plaintiff.
Moreover, the liability of defendants who are corporate insiders
or professionals in the securities business may be imposed by broadening the concept of materiality to embrace non-disclosure, as distinct
from misstatement or half-truth. 35 This imposition of an affirmative
duty of disclosure on the insider has been based on two rationales,
taken either severably or together. First, his conduct may be considered as a scheme or course of business which operates as a fraud
on investors. 36 Second, silence may be deemed an implied representation that the insider has not withheld any material information
which his quasi-fiduciary position requires him to reveal.3 7

31 See 3 Loss

1763-66.
"Reliance" and "causation" appear to be integral to the requirement that the fact
misrepresented or omitted be "material." In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra note 33,
at 463, the court reasoned that satisfying the tort law "principle of causation in fact,"
was a necessary element of a rule lOb-5 claim. The court states that "the proper
test [of reliance] is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently
than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed. . . . This
test preserves the common law parallel between 'reliance' and 'materiality,' differing as
it does from the definition of 'materiality' under Rule lOb-5 solely by substituting the
individual plaintiff for the reasonable man." Ibid.
Whether defendant's scienter (i.e., that defendant knew or reasonably should have
known of the untruth or incompleteness of his statement) must necessarily be alleged
is still in doubt. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757,
773 (D. Colo. 1964) (plaintiff must allege and prove defendant's scienter); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (dictum that scienter is not a
necessary element of the claim), aff"d, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
35,"It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the
stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting the value of
the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not
known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected
the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the
uninformed minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,
828-29 (D. Del. 1951), af'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
The "fraud" concepts developed under § 10b with respect to insiders apply to
broker-dealers as well. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In addition,
special broker-dealer fraud concepts have been formulated. For example, a brokerdealer always impliedly represents that his prices are reasonably related to the
current market unless he discloses to the contrary, Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v.
SEC, 189 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944), and any person
is entitled to rely on the implied representation regardless of his access to market information. United Securities Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 727 (1944). See 3 Loss 1482-93. A
broker-dealer who is held to have placed himself in a fiduciary relationship to his
customer must scrupulously make full disclosure of every element of his adverse in.
terest in the particular transaction. See 3 Loss 1500-08.
"0E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956).
37 E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., supra note 36, at 829. In that case, the court
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To summarize, it has been judicially determined that the policy
of protecting uninformed investors, which underlies the prohibitory
antifraud scheme of the securities acts, cannot be effectuated without a correlative system of general civil liability. To this end the
courts have applied rule 1Ob-5 in a free-wheeling fashion to encompass almost all misconduct in the purchase or sale of securities,
particularly where the transaction occurs in the context of a
fiduciary relationship. It has never been possible to delimit precisely the elements of a rule lOb-5 claim. The primary judicial consideration has been whether the alleged misconduct would subvert
the broad policy of investor protection prescribed by the securities
acts. Should such subversion appear, the elements of a rule 1Ob-5
claim are likely to be found present. 38
What result, then, could be expected when the federal courts extended rule 1Ob-5 to actions brought on behalf of corporations against
controlling insiders? The strict fiduciary duty which directors,
officers, and controlling shareholders owe the corporation would
seem to require the very highest standards of conduct in connection
with any corporate securities transaction. Moreover, virtually none
of the usual procedural obstacles to shareholder derivative actions
under state law would be encountered if the action were based on
rule lOb-5.39 The Third Circuit in 1961 characterized the then
seldom-utilized application of rule 1Ob-5 in this context as follows:
Section 10 (b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on management visa-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders. As implemented by Rule lOb-5 . . . Section 10 (b) provides stockholders
with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties. It
can be said fairly that the Exchange Act ...

ing federal substantive corporation law. 40

constitutes far reach-

This enthusiastic generalization, made without precedential support, has not been borne out by the development of subsequent case
emphasized that the three clauses of rule lOb-5 "are mutually supporting and not
mutually exclusive," and that an insider's breach of his disclosure obligations "can

be viewed as a violation of all three subparagraphs." Ibid. The court stated that "in
making an offer of 331% above the current market price, defendant impliedly
represented that the price offered was a fair price at that time." Id. at 843. See
generally 8 Loss 1450-66.
08 See notes 25-37 supra and accompanying text.
30 See note 5 supra.
,0 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961) (appeal from order refusing to require plaintiff to post security).
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law, most of which has evolved from decisions in the Second Circuit. 41
The Cautious Beginning-Birnbaum and Pettit
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,42 minority stockholders
of Newport brought a derivative action claiming that Feldman,
Newport's president and controlling stockholder, had rejected an
offer of merger which would have appreciably benefited the stockholders. Instead, he sold his controlling stock interest at a high
premium to another corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that in the
course of this transaction Feldman and the directors, whom he controlled, had breached their fiduciary duties to Newport and its
other stockholders and had made misrepresentations to the latter.
Plaintiffs sought federal jurisdiction under rule lOb-5 by claiming that "these misrepresentations operated as a fraud upon the
stockholders of Newport in connection with the sale of Feldman's
stock." 43 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
because neither Newport nor the complaining stockholders had
bought or sold securities within the meaning of the rule. 44 The court
also asserted that rule lOb-5 applied only to "that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than ... [the] fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs . . . ,,45 This language has been relied
on by defendant-insiders in subsequent cases where, in contradistinction to Birnbaum, they were alleged to have defrauded the corpora40
tion by causing it to buy or sell securities at an unfavorable price.
If deemed applicable in the latter context, the Birnbaum distinction
between rule lOb-5 fraud and "fraudulent mismanagement" can
be taken as shorthand for the argument that no rule 1Ob-5 claims
1" Cases in which courts in other circuits have taken cognizance of rule lOb-5 derivative actions on behalf of corporations against insiders include Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965) (action dismissed because of insufficient verification of complaint); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 376
(D. Del. 1965) (denied motion to dismiss complaint); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp.,
201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962) (denied motion to dismiss complaint); Annot., 37
A.L.R.2d 649 (1954).
12193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
"193 F.2d at 462.
"Plaintiffs later brought an action under state law for breach of fiduciary duty
and succeeded in obtaining relief in the celebrated case of Perlman v. Feldman, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
" 193 F.2d at 464.
"0See text accompanying notes 59, 65 infra.
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on behalf of corporations against management should be recog47
nized.
If Birnbaum in fact embraced the argument that fraudulent
mismanagement is never a 1Ob-5 concern, the impact of the case was
modified in 1963 when the massive Birrell frauds came to light in
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,48 a derivative action. 49 It was
claimed that Birrell, the controllifig stockholder, had induced the
corporation to issue him shares'5for worthless consideration and
that by conspiring with the Exchange and several of its members
Birrell had sold these overvalued shares to the public. Since procedural difficulties would have hampered recovery by the large and
scattered number of defrauded individual investors, and because
of the incredible proportions of the whole fraudulent scheme, the
court felt that the case demanded a private corporate remedy
under the federal securities acts. The court applied rule 1Ob-5,
but warned that the rule should not be used as a basis for
federal inquiry into internal corporate affairs where a purchase
or sale of securities is only "incidental to a major mismanagement
issue.""' However, the court continued, if the transaction involves
an "abuse of the securities trading process" and recourse to the
federal securities laws is necessary for an adequate remedy, the fact
that the action is against insiders does not in itself render rule
lOb-5 inapplicable. 52 This restrained approach seemed to indicate
" The argument may be summarized as follows: The Exchange Act was obviously
a broad assertion by Congress of its power to regulate securities transactions, but it is
equally clear that Congress did not intend to create a body of federal law for regulation of the internal affairs of ordinary business corporations. Congress has repeatedly rejected proposed legislation which would have this effect. Instead, corporate
mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty have deliberately been left to state law,
and it has adequately coped with these problems whether or not they occur in connection with a corporate securities transaction. It may be true that desirable procedural and perhaps substantive changes would be effected by permitting shareholder
derivative actions to be based on rule lOb-5 rather than state law, but such changes
should be accomplished, if at all, by a comprehensive legislative approach, not by
piecemeal judicial lawmaking. See 63 COLUm. L. REv. 934, 934-44 (1963); Comment, 74
YAuI L.J. 658, 681-82. See generally Ruder, supra note 4.
"8217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"9The action was brought on behalf of the corporation by its trustees in reorganization and was not- a shareholderderivative action. Id. at 21.
1oNotwithstanding any accounting concepts to the contrary, the issuance of stock
by a corporation is a "sale" within the meaning of rule lOb-5. Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"1217 F. Supp. at 25.
2Ibid.

The court noted that the case consisted of two fraudulent securities transactions:
(1) Birrell's inducing the corporation to issue him stock for virtually worthless
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that Pettit would be construed as representing the outer limit of
derivative actions against insiders under rule lOb-5.
Extension of Pettit-The Search for the "Elements"
Shortly after Pettit was decided, a corporate action was brought
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against
three former directors and officers in New Park Mining Co. v.
Cranmer.53 One of the allegations was that defendants had caused
plaintiff New Park to purchase stock at an inflated price in companies in which the defendants had recently acquired a stock interest for negligible consideration. Plaintiffs claimed that by concealing this course of conduct from New Park, defendants had rendered themselves liable to that corporation under rule lOb-5. Without attempting to define the substantive "elements" of a rule lOb-5
claim, the court held New Park's allegations legally sufficient. The
court also cited Pettit, with no mention of its exceptional facts, for
the general proposition that "it is immaterial whether the purchase
or sale was part of a larger scheme of corporate mismanagement if
the elements of a claim under .. . Rule lOb-5 are otherwise present." 54 This extension of Pettit has continued to be the general
consideration ana (2) Birrell's conspiring with members of the American Stock Exchange to sell the overvalued stock to the public. The court observed that the first
these transactions would suffice to justify the invocation of rule lOb-5 on behalf of
the corporation, but emphasized that "both transactions being one overall scheme in
which the channels of interstate commerce, the mail, and the Exchange were used
for fraudulent manipulation, and in which people trading in corporate securities
through the-Exchange facilities were damaged, defendants' effort to characterize the
trustees' claim as one of 'corporate mismanagement' to which Section 10(b) would
not apply is invalid and must be denied effect." Id. at 26.
The court also rejected defendant Exchange's contention that since it had not
conspired with Birrell until after he had fraudulently induced the corporation to
issue the stock, the fraud practiced by the Exchange could not be said to have
caused damage to the corporation but rather only to the individual investors who
had bought the stock. Emphasizing the broad effect of the overall fraudulent scheme
and the difficulties which the individual investors would face in pursuing a remedy,
the court simply swept aside defendant's technically appealing causation argument
and permitted the corporate action in order to achieve an adequate remedy and prevent a subversion of the policies of the securities acts. Id. at 26-28. For a criticism
of the court's reasoning in this respect see Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 679 n.86 (1965).
r' 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
r' Id. at 266. The court reasoned that to bar corporate actions against insiders
under rule lOb-5 would create the anomaly that "corporate officers and directors
would possess an immunity from the consequences of their fraud under Section 10-b
and Rule lOb-5 which outsiders who may have collaborated with them in defrauding
the corporation would not possess ......Ibid. This "anomaly," however, would
hardly seem to rebut the arguments against complementing insider liability for abuse
of corporate position under state law with additional liability to the corporation
under rule lOb-5. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. The court's reasoning
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position to which the courts ostensibly adhere. Subsequent decisions,
however, underscore the difficulty the courts have encountered in
determining when the "elements" of a rule lOb-5 derivative claim
are present.
In Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,55 a minority director of Roto
successfully asserted a claim for injunctive relief under rule lOb-5
against defendants, who constituted a controlling majority of the
board of directors. The facts alleged were that plaintiff, the largest
single shareholder of Roto, had amassed enough support to eliminate
control of the board by the defendants at the next annual shareholders meeting. With the date set for the meeting approaching, the
defendants launched an effort to retain control which, according to
the plaintiffs, was at all times "glaringly apparent."50 They announced a postponement of the shareholders meeting, falsely claiming that the latest financial statements had not yet been prepared.
Then they convened the board to approve the issuance and sale of
a large block of treasury stock at a low price to persons who had
agreed either to vote as directed or resell to the defendants. Denying plaintiff's demands for production of the latest financial data
and for discussion of all aspects of these transactions the defendants
quickly stamped the imprimatur of the board upon the proposed
sale. 57 The plaintiff then sought injunctive relief under rule lOb-5,
characterizing the alleged conduct as "a series of acts and practices
which operate as a fraud or deceit not only upon the stockholders...
'8
but on the corporation itself."
Relying on Birnbaum, the defendants argued that the plaintiff
had at most alleged the effectuation of corporate mismanagement
by a majority of the board in the fact of his protest, not "that type
of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities."5 9 It was further suggested that
a corporation could not possibly be "defrauded" within the meaning
of rule lOb-5 by the controlling majority of its board of directors. 60
The court of appeals, however, rejected these defenses and held
could logically be extended to embrace the proposition that the outsider should have
the same fiduciary responsibility to the corporation under state law as the insider,
a radical departure from concepts of fiduciary duty.
5 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
50 Reply Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7.
11339 F.2d at 26.
rs Statement of Points and Authorities for Plaintiff, p. 5.
11Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 5.
00 359 F.2d at 29,
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that a valid claim under rule lOb-5 had been stated.61 Birnbaum
was distinguished as applicable only when the allegedly defrauded
corporation was not a buyer or seller of securities. 62 The conceptual
difficulty arising from the fact that the defendants constituted a majority of the board was disposed of by the court as follows:
[A] majority or even the entire board of directors may be held to
have defrauded their corporation. When it is practical as well as
just to do so, courts have experienced no difficulty in rejecting
such cliches as the directors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud itself. 3
The court did not attempt to categorize defendants' conduct as
violative of a particular clause of rule lOb-5; all three provisions
were apparently deemed applicable to the "failure or refusal" to disclose pertinent facts to the minority directors. It was clearly considered immaterial that the allegedly unlawful scheme was, as the
plaintiff stated, so "glaringly apparent" that he was not actually
deceived. The corporation, not the plaintiff, was the "defrauded"
seller of securities. 64 The court reasoned that to deny a corporate
rule lOb-5 claim in the circumstances of Ruckle would, as a practical
matter, destroy any remedy against the defrauding directors under
the securities acts, undercutting the basic policies behind them by
leaving the minority shareholders unprotected and facilitating the
public distribution of worthless securities.65
Shortly after its decision in Ruckle, the Second Circuit was confronted with another lOb-5 derivative action in O'Neill v. Maytag.60
As in Ruckle, the controversy arose out of a control maneuver by the
directors, but the court in O'Neill affirmed the district court's
dismissal 67 of the claim. The O'Neill case arose from director action
which resulted in a barter of a block of the corporation's outstanding securities on terms which were clearly disadvantageous to the
corporation. In 1958 National and Pan American World Airways
had each issued 400,000 shares of its own common stock to a trustee
01 Id. at 27-28.
62 Ibid. The district court in an unreported decision had dismissed plaintiff's complaint, relying primarily on Birnbaum and O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235 (1964).
Appeal in the latter case was pending at the time the court of appeals rendered its
decision in Ruckle.
63 39 F.2d at 29. (Emphasis added.)
e6 Id. at 28.

IId. at 28-29.
6' 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
17 O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).

Vol. 1966:166]

DERIVATIVE ACTIONS UNDER lOb-5

for the benefit of the other. Finding this cross ownership detrimental
to the public interest, the Civil Aeronautics Board ordered the
companies either to sell or to re-exchange the stock. 8 Two of National's substantial shareholders and directors, Maytag and Swim,
were in complete control of its board of directors, but the block of
National shares held by the trustee for Pan American constituted
a threat to their control.6 9 For the alleged sole purpose of eliminating
this threat, National's board of directors unanimously approved an
exchange of 390,000 of the National shares held by Pan American for
353,000 of the Pan American shares held by National. This exchange
ratio was extremely unfavorable to National because the shares of its
own stock which were acquired were valued on the New York Stock
Exchange at about $1,800,000 less than the Pan American shares re70
leased.
The plaintiff proceeded on a tack similar to that taken by his
counterpart in Ruckle. The alleged conduct was characterized as a
scheme and course of conduct which operated as a fraud upon
National and its stockholders. 71 Further, the defendant again relied
on Birnbaum, contending that plaintiff had at best alleged a claim
under state law for corporate waste and breach of fiduciary duty since
no fraud or deception of any kind had been alleged, much less fraud
of the type usually associated with securities trading.7 2
The court of appeals essentially accepted the defenses interposed, stating that:
There can be no serious claim of deceit, withheld information or
misstatement of material fact in this case....
.... The question posed by this case is whether it is sufficient
for an action under Rule lOb-5 to allege a breach of... fiduciary
duties where the breach does not involve deception.73
The court reasoned that a negative answer to this question followed
from its acceptance of the Birnbaum view that rule lOb-5 applied
3' F.2d at 766.
$39
Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 6-7.
7o 339 F.2d at 767.
71 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 8.
72
Brief for Defendants, p. 8.
The defendant further asserted that "deception under rule lOb-5 contemplates

the creation by one person of a false appearance, whether by deed, word, or silence,
But here
which is transmitted to another person inducing him to buy or sell ....
the charge is that all persons involved in the share exchange . . . were all guilty of
breaching their fiduciary duties. Deception was thus impossible." Id. at 19.
73 39 F.2d at 767.
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solely to the usual type of fraud in securities transactions and not
to the state law matter of "fraudulent mismanagement." 74 No rule
lOb-5 claim is stated in the absence of "an allegation of facts amounting to deception," although "it need not be deception in any restricted common law sense ...
-75 The O'Neill court did note that
the ocdurrence of the alleged deception within the corporate structure would not in itself prevent the application of rule 10b-5. 70 In
this respect the court distinguished Ruckle as involving "a clear
77
allegation of deception."
Within the matrix of these rationales, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,7 8
purported not only to follow Ruckle and O'Neill simultaneously
but also to add a new "element" which it found to be consistent
with both. In Anaconda a rule lOb-5 derivative action was brought
on behalf of a subsidiary corporation against both its directors and
the parent corporation. It was alleged that the parent and the directors of the subsidiary had collaborated to enable the parent to
acquire all the assets of the subsidiary in exchange for stock of an
inadequate value. This transaction required approval by the owners
of two-thirds of the subsidiary's stock. 79 However, because the parent
owned seventy-three per cent of the subsidiary's stock, the approval
was assured. Nevertheless, the parent chose to camouflage the
questionable aspects of the transaction by causing the directors of
the sudsidiary to distribute a false and misleading proxy statement
for its upcoming special shareholders meeting. At the meeting the
parent utilized its dominant stock interest to dictate approval of the
sale of the subsidiary's assets. A minority shareholder of the sub7"

Id. at 768.

71

Ibid.

The court observed that the particular breach of fiduciary duties commonly
occasioned through the purchase or sale of securities, such as breaches by brokers
and investment advisors, "may well be the kind of 'fraudulent practice usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities'" and thus violative of rule l0b.5
even in the absence of "deception." Id. at 769.
6 Id. at 768. The court intimated that deception within the corporate structure
would be grounds for a lOb-5 claim even where all the directors participated in the
alleged fraud. However, the court cautioned that rule lOb-5 should not serve
as the federal court's "mandate to inquire into every allegation of breach of fiduciary
duty respecting the issuance or sale of corporate securities." Ibid.
77 Id. at 768.
I8238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'I DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 271, 275 (c) (1953).
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sidiary then brought a derivative action under rule 1Ob-5 against
its directors and the parent.8 0
The court stated that the rule to be derived from Ruckle and
O'Neill was that allegations of deception "by way of affirmative
8
misrepresentation or omission of material facts" were indispensable. '
However, the court reasoned that even though the plaintiff in
Anaconda had alleged deception his claim was defective because
there was no "causal relationship" between the deception and plaintiff's damage. The minority shareholders of the subsidiary could
not possibly have blocked the parent's course of action by any "internal corporate procedures." Therefore, the parent did not have to
indulge in any deception which would give rise to a rule lOb-5
claim, and the fact that it had chosen to do so was immaterial.
Plaintiff's damage was "caused" not by the alleged violation of rule
1Ob-5 but solely by breach of corporate fiduciary duty for which re2
dress should be sought under state law.
Ruckle, O'Neill, and Anaconda raise the following basic questions: (1) If Ruckle and O'Neill can be reconciled on the basis of
"deception," what is the effect of making such "deception" requisite
to a rule 1Ob-5 derivative claim against insiders? (2) Is the Anaconda
"causation" requirement consistent with the Ruckle-O'Neill "deception" concept?
1. Deception
In both Ruckle and O'Neill it was alleged that the corporation
had been or would be damaged by selling securities at an unfavorably
low price. In both cases it was claimed that the defendants had
utilized their control to insure approval of the sale by the board of
the directors. The essence of the rule lOb-5 claims in these cases,
then, was that defendants had not allowed the board of directors
to function as the decision making body of the corporation, but rather
as the defendants' personal agent. Although both complaints obvi80 238 F. Supp. at 768-69.
Id. at 775.
82
Id. at 776. Because the misrepresentations were allegedly made in proxy statements, the plaintiffs in Anaconda also claimed violation of and a private remedy under
the federal proxy rules enumerated in Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a),
48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1964). Plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court's
broad approval of shareholder derivative actions under § 14 (a) in J. L Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The district court also denied this claim, finding no causal
relation between the director-parent action and the securities transaction being challenged. Borak was distinguished by reasoning that the corporate transaction in that case
could not have been approved without the plaintiffs' votes. 238 F. Supp. at 771.
81
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ously stated a corporate claim for breach of fiduciary responsibility,
only in Ruckle was the breach held to have been accompanied by
"deception." Since the claim asserted in each case was that of the corporation, the decisions are reconcilable only if interpreted as holding
that in Ruckle deception against the corporation was alleged but
was not in O'Neill. However, a definition of "the corporation"
is not entirely clear in these cases. Obviously, defendants who constitute the body controlling the corporate entity cannot be said to
have deceived themselves. They can only have deceived the minority segment 3 which appears to be, therefore, "the corporation'
on behalf of which the rule lOb-5 claim is really asserted. 4 Clearly,
as the court in Ruckle indicates, the primary justification for recognizing derivative actions against insiders under rule lOb-5 is to provide an adequate remedy under the securities acts for uninformed
minority shareholders8 5 If "deception," therefore, is to be a necessary element of rule 1Ob-5 claims in the instant cases, it can only be
meaningful in terms of its operation against the corporation's minority segment.
Certain factual differences between Ruckle and O'Neill may
render the two decisions distinguishable. In Ruckle there was allegedly a direct confrontation of the defendants, who were a controlling majority of the board of directors, with the minority directors. Defendants, after futile attempts to deceive the minority,
simply engineered the board's approval of the transaction over the
minority's protest and refused to reveal facts on which the propriety
of the action from the corporation's standpoint should have been
judged.8 6 In O'Neill, however, there was no direct communication
between defendants and the complaining minority shareholders
because all of the directors participated in the allegedly fraudulent
conduct. The defendants merely voted the board's approval of the
exchange at a grossly unfavorable ratio, motivated solely by the enhancement of their control. Since nothing more was allegedli attempted by defendants, the court concluded that the O'Neill
83By "minority segment" is meant the non-controlling element of the corporate
entity which can, as in O'Neill, consist of shareholders holding a majority of the
corporation's stock but who are nevertheless not in control.
81 The derivative action, however, may inure as much to the benefit of the corpora.
tion's creditors as the minority shareholders. This is demonstrably true where, as in
Pettit v. American Stock Exch., the action is brought by the corporation's trustees in
reorganization. See Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 679 n.86 (1965).
85 339 F.2d at 29; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
8'See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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complaint, unlike that of _Ruckle, was completely devoid of any
"deception," which the court defined as " 'that type of fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities .... ",87 Apparently the court's "deception" requirement can be
met only by allegations that the defendants actively attempted to
deceive the minority segment, generally by withholding or misrepresenting material facts.8 If no such active deception is alleged,
nothing more than a claim of "fraudulent mismanagement" is
stated, for which state law and not rule 1Ob-5 is the traditional and
only source of redress.
Despite this ostensible reconciliation of Ruckle and O'Neill,
the Second Circuit appears to have made an abrupt change in its
basic approach. In O'Neill the court attached crucial importance
to the distinction it had drawn in Birnbaum between "fraudulent
mismanagement" and the type of "fraudulent practice usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities."8' 9 In Ruckle this
same distinction was ignored entirely,9 0 and it is hard to divine the
reason for according it more weight in O'Neill. Although Birnbaum
was an attempted derivative action under rule 1Ob-5 against a controlling insider, it involved no sale or purchase of securities by
the corporation. Instead, there had merely been a sale by the
defendant insider of his own stock to another company. There
was no occasion in Birnbaum to determine the presence or absence
of "deception"; rather, it was conceded that direct misrepresentations
to the minority shareholders had been alleged. 91 The pivotal holding in Birnbaum was that for a plaintiff to have been defrauded "in
connection with" a purchase or sale of securities within the meaning
of rule IOb-5, he must have actually purchased or sold some securities.
It was understandably easy for the court in Birnbaum to find the
transaction essentially one involving "fraudulent mismanagement"
rather than fraud inhering in the buying or selling of securities.
The particular misrepresentations were not directed to an injured
party who had either bought or sold securities. Thus, the transaction lent itself to classification as something other than the type of
fraudulent practice usually directed at buyers and sellers. As the
'

87
88 339 F.2d at 768, quoting from Birnbaum.
This was the interpretation of the O'Neill "deception" requirement tendered by
the court in Anaconda. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
80 339 F.2d at 768-69.
90339 F.2d at 28.
91See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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court stated in Ruckle, the Birnbaum distinction seems wholly inapplicable to allegations that controlling insiders have defrauded
2
the corporation in its capacity as a buyer or seller of securities.0
Moreover, the alleged misconduct in Ruckle, which the court in
O'Neill characterized as a "clear allegation of deception," can
hardly be called the type of fraud usually associated with securities
transactions consummated in a context of corporate control by in9-2339 F.2d at 28. See 3 Loss 1770-71; Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or
Holder of Shares in a Close CorporationUnder the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 505, 521 (1953).

This of course assumes that the defendant insiders have effected either a sale
at too low or a purchase at too high a price by the corporation. Otherwise, whatever damage the corporation may allegedly have suffered will presumably be regarded
as resulting from mere "fraudulent mismanagement" as distinguished from rule
lOb-5 "fraud." In the recent case of Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), the defendant insiders allegedly caused the corporation to issue misleading
statements which had the effect of depressing the value of its stock. Defendants
then caused the corporation to purchase a large part of its outstanding stock at the
depressed price. The minority shareholders who had not sold their stock brought a
derivative action under rule lOb-5 on behalf of the corporation to recover damages for
corporate waste allegedly committed by defendants in the process of their control
maneuver. The court held that the corporation had no rule lob-5 claim against
the defendants: "[T]he Company purchased, rather than sold, at the fraudulently
depressed price, [and] the sellers and not the Company were the 'victims' of the
alleged fraud. . . Indeed, the immediate effect of the Company's purchasing at a
price below value was to benefit, rather than injure, the Company." Id. at 227.
(Emphasis supplied by the court.) The court stated that neither the fraudulent acquisition of control nor damages resulting from acts of waste committed by those in
control as a result of the fraud constituted an injury to the corporation within the
meaning of rule lOb-5. Id. at 228-29. The court, however, left open the possibility
of a corporate rule lOb-5 claim on similar facts where there were allegations of "a
conspiracy to loot the Company or to waste its assets." Id. at 228. See 3 Loss 1469.
Moreover, the court noted that since the plaintiff shareholders had neither bought nor
sold any securities, the Birnbaum rule would prevent their suing defendants under
rule lOb-5 directly. 241 F. Supp. at 228.
But see Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965), where the controlling stockholders of A corporation allegedly caused it to
merge with another company which they controlled. Under state law the minority
shareholders of A were required to surrender their stock for the amount designated
in the merger agreement or, in lieu thereof, its value as determined in an appraisal
proceeding. Defendants allegedly made false statements in order to set the surrender
value specified in the agreement at an inordinately low figure. The court held that
the plaintiff, a minority shareholder of A who was ignorant of the false nature of defendant's statement but had requested an appraisal, was a seller within the meaning
of rule lOb-5 and could assert a claim thereunder against defendants despite any remedy
which might be pursued in an appraisal proceeding under state law. 241 F. Supp.
at 373-75. The court also left open the possibility that the plaintiff shareholder could
assert a rule lOb-5 claim derivatively on behalf of A corporation although under state
law no derivative action was permitted because of the merger. The court stated:
"Where federally secured rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for that invasion, a federal court may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done." Id. at 376, citing J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433 (1964). See note 5 supra.
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siders. The Ruckle defendants in their face-to-face dealings with
the minority directors did withhold material facts, and for this
reason the O'Neill requirement of "deception" was said to be satisfied. However, the O'Neill description of Ruckle is somewhat misleading in this respect:
[A] majority of the board of directors ...secured the board's approval of issuance of securities at an arbitrary value by withholding
the most recent financial statements ....93
If the court means that the Ruckle defendants secured the minority
directors' approval of the transaction, then the statement appears
inaccurate. The minority was fully aware of the control maneuver
which the defendants were attempting. The minority was equally
aware that the financial statements were being withheld and demanded to see them. Defendants simply refused and forced approval of the transaction.94 All that defendants could hope to accomplish by their "deception" was to hinder an injunctive suit by
the minority. Outside the context of corporate control by insiders,
this is surely not the usual type of rule 1Ob-5 fraud. But the whole
tenor of the Ruckle decision was that rule lOb-5 should be applied
within this context, and that it should be used to effectuate the
usual objective of its application against insiders-to prevent their
exploitation of the minority shareholders.
Of course, if the court accurately assumed that the alleged
breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants in O'Neill was accompanied by "honest disclosure," 95 then its decision appears eminently
sound. Rule 1Ob-5 is clearly not designed to insure an adequately
informed purchaser or seller against the risk of his making a bad
bargain. However, the court apparently equated "honest disclosure" with the absence of its concept of "deception," and this
seems contrary to the normal meaning of rule lOb-5 "fraud" by
fiduciaries. A corporate insider dealing as an individual directly
with a minority shareholder has an affirmative duty of disclosure,
not a duty to refrain from affirmative deception. 6 The insider's
failure to disclose material facts has been held to constitute a course
89 F.2d at 768. (Emphasis added.)
o'The Ruckle court held that a violation of rule lOb-5 by defendants would be
accomplished by their "failure or refusal" to disclose material facts. 339 F.2d at 26.
(Emphasis added.)
05339 F.2d at 767.
90Sqe note $5-37 supra and accompanyin& text,
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of business which operates as a fraud on the minority shareholder
cognizable under rule 10b-5. 97 The insider's offer to purchase or
sell at a certain price may be deemed an implied representation that
the stated price is his judgment of the value of the security.0 8 These
standards, and arguably the more stringent ones applicable to
broker-dealers, 99 would seem even more appropriate where, as in
O'Neill, all the directors effect a sale or purchase by the corporation.
In such a case the corporate power structure renders the shareholders
of the minority segment much more vulnerable to insider exploitation than they would be in a direct confrontation. Therefore, the
alleged approval of the corporation's sale of securities by the O'Neill
directors without consideration of any material facts except their
desire to use $1,800,000 in corporate funds to cement their control,
would seem to operate as a fraud on "the corporation" under rule
lOb-5. 100
In rejoinder to this contention, the O'Neill court asserted that
the defendants did nothing more than exercise their corporate control positions for their own purposes. This may have been a breach
of fiduciary duty, but was not deemed to be the "deception" which
is requisite to support a corporate rule 1Ob-5 claim. In rebuttal,
however, it may be argued that defendants had no need to resort
to any active "deception." This fact is the anomaly of the "deception" requirement: where the control of exploiting insiders over
the corporate mechanism they employ approaches the absolute, as
in O'Neill, the necessity for the usual type of fraudulent practice
decreases. Correlatively, there is an increase in the vulnerability
of the minority segment whose protection is the justification for
applying rule 1Ob-5 at all. Thus, a successful derivative action against
insiders under rule 1Ob-5 becomes least likely where it is most
needed.
9

See text accompanying note 36 supra.

98 See note 37 supra.

11See text accompanying notes 25-38 supra.
100 Such an interpretation was rendered by the court in Ruckle, which relied on
§ (3) of rule lOb-5. 339 F.2d at 28-29.
The implication which minority stockholders would fairly be expected to draw
from a sale by the directors is that the price paid was reasonable and that the directors
were motivated by a proper corporate purpose in approving the transaction. Achievement of quite different and culpable ends may thus be sufficient to denote such action
as implied misrepresentation.
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2. Causation
The jeopardy of the minority wrought by the artificialities of the

"deception" concept would become completely entrenched if the
Anaconda "causation" requirement were to be approved by the Second Circuit. This theory insulates controlling insiders even where
the minority has been actually deceived. According to the district
court in Anaconda, if the minority could not have prevented the
alleged breach of fiduciary duty by any intracorporate procedures,
the fact that the breach was accompanied by "deception" is immaterial. 101 The "deception" which would otherwise give rise to a
rule lOb-5 derivative claim becomes meaningless because the defendants could have accomplished their breach of duty without it.
The breach of fiduciary duty is therefore said to be the only cause
of the corporation's damage and actionable exclusively under
state law.
The district court's "causation" theory may be short-lived, however, because it appears incompatible with the holding by the Court
of Appeals in Ruckle and its rationale in O'Neill. In Ruckle there
was no intracorporate procedure by which the plaintiffs could have
prevented approval of the transaction. 10 2 Plaintiff's only recourse
was to threaten and/or actually pursue a legal remedy. The possibility of seeking legal relief is the reason why non-disclosure, contrary to the Anaconda court's reasoning, is meaningful in this type
of case.103 Legal proceedings also constituted the only means of
stopping the O'Neill defendants, where the court clearly indicated

101 The court derived its "causation" requirement from List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). In List, an individual plaintiff alleged that a defendantdirector had concealed material facts in purchasing the plaintiff's stock. The court of
appeals affirmed a judgment for defendant because the evidence revealed that plaintiff
would not have acted differently had he known the undisclosed facts. Id. at 463-64.
Surely it does not follow that recovery would have been denied merely because the
defendant could have forced plaintiff either to sell or bring legal proceedings. See
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
102
Prevention of the transaction in Ruckle would only have been possible if the
defendants had permitted a shareholder meeting before approval of the allegedly
fraudulent sale. The defendants were able to effect the approval because there
was no intracorporate procedure by which the defendants could be forced to permit
the shareholders meeting to be held. See text accompanying notes 57, 93-94 supra.
With respect to the district court's efforts subsequent to Anaconda to employ or
limit the "causation" theory, compare Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), with Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and Voege v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp., supra note 101.
103 Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1146,
1164 (1965).
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that the defendants would have been subject to liability under rule
lOb-5 if they had indulged in "deception."
Conclusion

To summarize, development in the Second Circuit of rule 1Ob-5
derivative actions against controlling insiders has progressed in
three stages:
(1) Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co. through Pettit v. American

Stock Exchange. Rule 1Ob-5 has no application unless the corporation has either bought or sold securities, and even then it
should rarely apply because it is directed solely at "that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities rather than fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs ... "104
However, a rule lOb-5 claim may be recognized if a serious abuse
of the securities trading process is alleged, recourse to the federal
securities acts is necessary for an adequate remedy, and the corporate securities transaction is more than merely incidental to
a major mismanagement issue.
(2) New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer through Ruckle v. Roto

Am. Corp. A rule lOb-5 claim is stated whenever it is alleged
that the corporation has been "defrauded" by insiders in its
capacity as a buyer or seller of securities, and the fact that the
corporate purchase or sale is only part of a major mismanagement
issue is immaterial. The presence or absence of the elements of
rule lOb-5 "fraud" will be determined by considering the alleged
facts in conjunction with the reason for the general application
of rule lOb-5 in this context-to protect uninformed minority shareholders in accordance with the broad policies of the securities acts.
(3) O'Neill v. Maytag to the present. Although a rule lOb-5
claim is stated whenever it is alleged that insiders have "defrauded" the corporation in its purchase or sale of securities, the
elements of rule lOb-5 "fraud" will not be present unless there is
alleged something more than the mere utilization by defendants
of their controlling position in the corporate power structure.
It is not enough to allege that defendants intentionally breached
their fiduciary duty in effectuating the corporate purchase or sale
at a price unfavorable to the corporation, and that no responsible segment of the corporation was informed of its essentials.
There must also be some active, affirmative attempt to deceive
"the corporation" beyond any deception which may be inherent
in a mere breach of fiduciary duty.
104 193 F.2d at 464.
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It is submitted that the pattern of this development is essentially circular. The same basic judicial objectives underlie the
Birnbaum-Pettit and the O'Neill formulas. Rule lOb-5 is to be
retained as a possible source of remedy for exploited minority segments, but its use in this respect will be limited severely enough to
prevent its competing to any substantial degree with the traditionally
applicable state law. In pursuit of these objectives, the BirnbaumPettit technique apparently would proceed from the premise that
the rule has no general application even where insiders have allegedly defrauded the corporation in a manner which, in any other
context, would constitute rule lOb-5 "fraud." The rule would be
applied only when the court discerns such an "abuse of the securities trading process" to justify affording plaintiffs the advantages
of a derivative action under the federal securities acts. This approach is essentially opposite to that of New Park-Ruckle, under
which rule lOb-5 would be deemed generally applicable for the
protection of "defrauded," non-controlling shareholders and the
requisite "fraud" would be flexibly defined to achieve that protection. Conversely, the most recent technique, articulated in O'Neill,
is to channel the development back toward Birnbaum-Pettitwhile
purporting to adhere to the New Park-Ruckle formula. Rule lOb-5
is always to be available for "defrauded," non-controlling shareholders, but the traditionally flexible elements of the rule's "fraud"
are to be so compressed that invocation will rarely be successful.
In this respect it appears that the O'Neill approach is likely to
necessitate continually accelerated judicial footwork and to produce
distinctions which, while they partially insulate state law from rule
1Ob-5, have little meaning in terms of the rationale proffered to
justify the rule's general applicability. If the rule's application is
to be substantially limited for the sake of preserving state law, it
would seem better to accomplish that preservation by the BirnbaumPettit technique. If this approach were employed to permit the
rule's application beyond the massive fraud context of Pettit, it
would obviously call for somewhat arbitrary decisions as to when a
sufficient "abuse of the securities trading process" is alleged. Moreover, even if such an "abuse" were found, a rule lOb-5 claim might
be denied where it appeared that plaintiff's remedies under state
law would be adequate. At least, however, such decisions could be
correlated to the court's statement of the justification for permitting
the rule's intrusion into the corporation-management relationship.
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The other alternative, assuming that the courts will not retreat
to a complete denial of the rule's application, is to employ it freely
for the protection of non-controlling shareholders in accordance
with the New Park-Ruckle reasoning. If this course were followed,
the natural and seemingly inescapable result would be that which
the Third Circuit suggested at the inception of the rule's expansion as a corporate weapon against overreaching insiders:
Section 10 (b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on management
vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders. As implemented by Rule lOb-5 ... Section 10 (b) provides stockholders
with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties. 05
Such an unrestrained extension of "federal corporation law" has
been generally and somewhat convincingly described as undesirable, 0 6 but it could hardly be less satisfactory than current judicial
efforts to inject, within tenuously defined limits, a modicum of rule
1Ob-5 serum into shareholder derivative actions against controlling
insiders.
100 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
939 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
100 See note 47 supra.

